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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
West One Trust Company, successor personal representative 
of the estate of Merlin R. Morrison, Sr. 
Heirs of Merlin R. Morrison, Sr.: 
* Edna R. Morrison, surviving spouse 
Floren B. Nelson, surviving son 
* John G. Morrison, surviving son 
* Merlin R. Morrison, Jr., surviving son 
* Marjorie M. Steed, surviving daughter 
Michael H. Morrison, surviving son 
* Kathleen M. Kelly, surviving daughter 
* James C. Morrison, surviving grandson 
Tonya Willey, surviving granddaughter 
Laura Willey, surviving granddaughter 
Persons with an asterisk designation are appellants in this 
appeal. Appellants improperly designate themselves as "plaintiffs" 
and West One Trust Company as "defendant" in the caption of this 
case on the cover page of their Brief. 
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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction of 
this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j), not Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(k) as asserted by appellants. The Utah Supreme 
Court transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeals for 
disposition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) . The Utah Court 
of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
West One Trust Company disputes that appellants7 second and 
third issues presented for review are properly before this Court 
because these issues were not preserved in the district court. 
Additionally, appellants do not provide (i) any citation to the 
record showing that these issues were preserved in the trial court 
or (ii) any statement of grounds for seeking review of issues not 
preserved in the trial court as required by Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(5). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-909. See Addendum A for a complete 
recitation of that section. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-1006. See Addendum B for a 
complete recitation of that section. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition of the 
Case Below, 
This appeal results from the administration of the estate of 
Merlin R. Morrison, Sr. (the "Estate"). On October 31, 1995, the 
district court found, among other things, that a cash distribution 
made to the heirs of the Estate was improper pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann, § 75-3-909 and ordered that "sufficient funds should be repaid 
on a pro rata basis so that the claims against the estate could be 
satisfied-" R. 1724-6. Appellants appeal only that portion of the 
decision of the district court. 
Statement of Facts 
West One Trust Company ("West One") disputes the statement of 
facts in substantial part set forth by appellants for the reason 
that appellants misrepresent certain facts, fail to disclose 
certain material facts, fail to make appropriate citation to the 
record and otherwise attempt to mislead this Court. A more 
complete and accurate statement of the relevant facts follows. 
Heirs and Personal Representatives. 
1. Merlin R. Morrison, Sr. ("Morrison, Sr.") died intestate 
on January 17, 1983. R. 3-6 and 22-24. 
2. Morrison, Sr. died leaving the following heirs: 
Name Relationship 
Edna R. Morrison surviving spouse 
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Floren B. Nelson surviving son 
John G. Morrison surviving son 
Merlin R. Morrison, Jr. surviving son 
Marjorie M. Steed surviving daughter 
Michael H. Morrison surviving son 
Kathleen M. Kelly surviving daughter 
James C. Morrison surviving grandson 
Tonya Willey surviving granddaughter 
Laura Willey surviving granddaughter 
R. 3-6. 
3. The district court has appointed three personal 
representatives in this matter. Edna R. Morrison, the decedent's 
surviving spouse, was appointed as the first personal 
representative of the Estate serving in that capacity from 
January 24, 1984 to May 19, 1988. R. 22-24 and 148-151. 
4. In an attempt to quell the in-family disputes that have 
plagued the administration of this Estate, Floren B. Nelson, a 
half-brother to the other children of the decedent, was appointed 
as the successor personal representative of the Estate and served 
from May 19, 1988 to February 14, 1990. R. 148-151 and 224-227. 
5. When it was finally determined that the appointment of an 
independent personal representative would be required to assure the 
proper administration of the Estate, on February 14, 1990, West One 
was appointed as personal representative of the Estate and has 
since served in that capacity. R. 224-227 and 868-870. 
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Companion Actions 
6. By the time West One was appointed personal 
representative of the Estate, two companion actions had been filed 
by the prior personal representatives. On January 6, 1986, Edna R. 
Morrison brought an action against Merlin R. Morrison, Jr. 
("Morrison, Jr.") relative to three parcels of real property 
(commonly referred to as the Bacchus, Clark7s Lane and Burke's Lane 
properties), the ownership of which the heirs disputed (the "1986 
Action") . The 1986 Action was ultimately dismissed. On May 31, 
1988, Floren B. Nelson brought, in essence, the same action against 
Morrison, Jr. and Edna R. Morrison relative to the same properties 
(the "1988 Action"). The district court granted summary judgment 
for Morrison, Jr. On appeal, this Court reversed the grant of 
summary judgment, and remanded the case to the district court. 
West One Trust Co. v. Morrison, 861 P. 2d 1058 (Utah Ct. App. 1993.) 
On remand, a jury found that Morrison, Sr. intended to hold the 
three properties in joint tenancy with Morrison, Jr. Therefore, 
upon Morrison, Sr.'s death, Morrison, Jr. became the sole owner of 
the three properties and, accordingly, the Estate has no interest 
in the properties. West One did not appeal the jury's verdict. 
7. Appellants attempt to mislead this Court and claim that 
the result of the 1988 Action has some bearing on this appeal. 
Appellants7 Brief, pg. 4, f f 3, 1, 2; pg. 5, f f 4, 5. The 1988 
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Action and the ultimate determination of ownership of the three 
properties have absolutely nothing to do with this appeal• Rather, 
the subject matter of this appeal is a parcel of real estate which 
commonly has been referred to as the "9th South Property", the 
relevant history of which is described below. 
9th South Property 
8. As evidenced in the initial inventory filed in the 
Estate, Morrison, Sr. owned at the time of his death an interest in 
"4,000 shares of the capital stock of Morrison Investment Company, 
a Utah corporation" (the "Stock")• R. 18-21 (See in particular 
Schedule B, R. 20.) 
9. In order to settle disputes between the heirs of the 
Estate and other Morrison family members (in particular, a brother 
of Morrison, Sr.), the Stock was traded for a parcel of real 
property and improvements located at 905 South State, Salt Lake 
City, Utah (the "9th South Property"). R. 287. 
10. Neither Morrison, Sr. nor Morrison, Jr. ever held any 
title interest in the 9th South Property, either individually or 
jointly, prior to the death of Morrison, Sr. See the closing 
documents attached hereto as Addendum C. 
11. Due to the substantial time the Estate had been open, 
within four months after its appointment as personal representative 
in February 1990, West One engaged in settlement discussions with 
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the heirs in an attempt to settle the 1988 Action and close the 
estate. Settlement negotiations continued thereafter on a regular 
basis. R. 1128, flf 7-8. 
12. After settlement negotiations had broken down, which 
negotiations even included the potential of conveying the 9th South 
Property to the heirs as tenants-in-common, West One determined to 
sell the 9th South Property. Accordingly, West One secured an 
appraisal of the 9th South Property as of November 1, 1991. The 
9th South Property was appraised at a value of $430,000.00. R. 
1137-1139. 
13. West One received two offers to purchase the 9th South 
Property. One offer received from a third party was for 
$352,900.00, approximately $77,000.00 less than the appraised 
value. R. 1131. 
14. The second offer to purchase the 9th South Property was 
received from Morrison, Jr. for $340,000.00, approximately 
$90,000.00 less than the appraised value. Morrison, Jr.'s offer 
contained certain terms and conditions including the condition that 
the net sales proceeds be immediately distributed by the Estate to 
the heirs. R. 1140-1144. 
15* Pursuant to an order of the district court, on March 19, 
1992, several of the heirs, representatives of West One, and 
counsel for the parties again met to discuss the potential of 
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settling the 1988 Action, which was then on appeal, and to close 
the Estate. Three heirs that were present at the meeting stated 
that they desired to pursue the appeal of the 1988 Action and to 
reject Morrison, Jr.'s offer to purchase the 9th South Property. 
R. 1130, fl4. 
16. From West One's perspective, to permit Morrison, Jr. to 
purchase the 9th South Property at the amount of $340,000.00 could 
well have constituted a breach of West One's fiduciary duties to 
the other heirs of the Estate. The offer to purchase the 9th South 
Property by Morrison, Jr. and to settle the 1988 Action, was also 
conditioned on Morrison, Jr. receiving the entire interest in the 
three properties which were the subject of the 1988 Action, and 
which properties had a value in excess of $1 million. The 
settlement offer appeared to West One as an attempt by Morrison, 
Jr. to abscond with the three properties and hopefully pacify the 
other heirs with a fraction of what they were rightfully entitled 
to receive. R. 1132. 
17. In a effort to further his scheme, on July 14, 1992, 
Morrison, Jr. filed a motion for an order requiring that West One 
accept his offer to purchase the 9th South Property with the stated 
terms and conditions and to close the Estate. R. 1105-6. 
18. On December 23, 1992, the district court entered an order 
(the "1992 Order") directing that in the event the 9th South 
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Property had not been sold to a third party by December 21, 1992, 
West One was to accept Morrison, Jr.'s offer including the terms 
and conditions contained in the offer and distribute the net sales 
proceeds to the heirs of the Estate. R. 1158-9. 
19. On July 1, 1993, the sale of the 9th South Property to 
Morrison, Jr. was consummated. See Addendum C. 
20. As evidenced by the closing documents, the transfer of 
title of the 9th South Property was from West One, as personal 
representative of the Estate, to Morrison, Jr. and Edna R. 
Morrison. The 9th South Property was never owned by Morrison, Sr. 
and Morrison, Jr. in joint tenancy or otherwise. See Addendum C. 
21. Subsequently, the net sales proceeds from the sale of the 
9th South Property in the amount of $326,853.02 were distributed to 
the heirs. Edna R. Morrison received $163,427.00. Each of the 
surviving children of Morrison, Sr. received $23,346.00 and each of 
the surviving grandchildren, taking through a deceased child, 
received $7,782.00. See Addendum C. 
22. After the trial of the 1988 Action in October 1994, West 
One attempted to close the Estate in an orderly fashion. However, 
Morrison, Jr. and other heirs challenged West One's efforts through 
a series of motions. The first motion was an objection to payment 
of the attorney fees and costs incurred by West One in the 1988 
Action. Morrison, Jr. claimed that the 1988 Action was pursued in 
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bad faith. R. 1572-4. The district court entered an order finding 
that the 1988 Action was brought in good faith and awarded attorney 
fees and costs in the amount of $52,371.12 to Campbell Maack & 
Sessions as a cost of administration of the Estate. R. 1721-2. 
23. After the distribution of the sales proceeds from the 9th 
South Property to the heirs, West One discovered that neither of 
the prior personal representatives had filed federal or state 
estate income tax returns for the years 1984 through 1986. The 
taxes, penalties and interest have not yet been finally determined 
but are estimated to be between $30,000.00 and $60,000.00. 
Following this discovery, Morrison, Jr. filed another motion and 
claimed that the payment of the estate income taxes, penalties and 
interest had priority over the payment of attorney fees and costs. 
R. 1625-1630. 
24. On October 31, 1995, the district court entered an order 
(the "1995 Order") finding that (1) the attorney fees and costs are 
a cost of administration and have priority as to payment over the 
estate income taxes and (ii) "[t]he previous distribution to the 
heirs in the amount of $326,000.00 from the sales proceeds of the 
900 South Property was improper and sufficient funds should be 
repaid on a pro rata basis so that the claims against the estate 
may be satisfied." R. 1724-6. 
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25. On November 30, 1995, appellants filed their Joint Notice 
of Appeal relative to the 1995 Order, appealing only the 
distribution recovery issue. R. 1727-9. 
26. As of March 31, 1996, the Estate had cash assets of 
$25,928.00 but unpaid obligations in excess of $80,000.00 and 
potentially much more depending on the penalties and interest 
assessed relative to the unpaid estate income taxes. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
First, the 1995 Order does not constitute a final order from 
which an appeal may be taken. Accordingly, this appeal should be 
dismissed. 
Second, the 9th South Property was not owned by Morrison, Sr. 
and Morrison, Jr. in joint tenancy at the time of Morrison, Sr.'s 
death. The 9th South Property became an asset of the Estate 
following Morrison, Sr.'s death as the result of a trade for 4,000 
shares of stock in the Morrison Investment Company that Morrison, 
Sr. owned at the time of his death. 
Third, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-909, the distribution 
of the 9th South Property sales proceeds was "improper." Recovery 
by West One from the heirs of a sufficient amount of the improper 
distribution to pay the remaining obligations of the Estate is 
expressly provided for by statute, and is not barred by 
adjudication, estoppel or limitation. 
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Finally, recovery by West One of a portion of the improper 
distribution to pay the remaining obligations of the Estate does 
not void the sale of the 9th South Property by West One to 
Morrison, Jr. or permit Morrison, Jr. to void that transaction. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE 1995 ORDER IS NOT A FINAL 
APPEALABLE ORDER, AND THIS COURT 
SHOULD DISMISS THIS APPEAL. 
The 1995 Order is not a final appealable order and was not 
certified for appeal by the district court. As such, this appeal 
is not properly before this Court, and should be dismissed. 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 provides for appeals from 
"final orders and judgments." Utah R. App. P. 3 (emphasis added). 
Interpreting this rule, the Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
The final judgment rule . . . precludes a 
party from taking an appeal from any orders or 
judgments that are not final." 
A.J. Mackay Co. v. Okland Const. Co., 817 P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 
1991). Final orders and judgments are those which "end[] the 
controversy between the parties litigant." Salt Lake City Corp. v. 
Lavton, 600 P.2d 538, 539 (Utah 1979). 
One exception to the final judgment rule permits appeals from 
non-final orders or judgments certified for appeal by the trial 
court under Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P. However, where "the order 
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appealed from was not final and was not certified nor eligible for 
certification under Rule 54(b), it [is] not properly taken. In a 
situation such as this, the remedy is dismissal of the appeal." 
Okland/ 817 P.2d at 325 (emphasis added). 
In the instant case, appellants appeal the 1995 Order 
requiring recovery of funds from the distributees of the Estate. 
The 1995 Order does not completely resolve the controversy between 
the parties, in that it does not decide the following issues: the 
award of any additional attorney fees to close the estate; the 
determination of the amount of estate income taxes owed; the 
payment of those taxes; the amount of funds to be recovered from 
distributees on either a pro rata basis or on some other basis, if 
a particular distributee is insolvent; and the closing of the 
estate. The 1995 Order addressed only the discreet issues of the 
priority of payment of the attorney fees and costs and the estate 
income taxes, and the propriety of the distribution of the 9th 
South Property proceeds. 
Additionally, the district court did not certify the 1995 
Order for appeal, nor did appellants seek such certification prior 
to bringing their appeal. Therefore, under Okland and Layton, 
because the 1995 Order is not a final order and was not certified 
for appeal, this Court should dismiss the appeal. 
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II 
THE 9TH SOUTH PROPERTY WAS NOT OWNED BY 
MORRISON, SR. AND MORRISON, JR. IN JOINT TENANCY 
AT THE TIME OF MORRISON, SR.'S DEATH. 
Assuming arguendo that this Court determines that this appeal 
is properly taken, appellant's arguments are without merit or 
support in the law and this Court should affirm the district 
court's 1995 order and dismiss the appeal on the merits. 
Appellants first argue in their brief that the 9th South 
Property should never have been considered an asset of the Estate 
in that Morrison, Sr. and Morrison, Jr. owned the property in joint 
tenancy at the time of Morrison, Sr.'s death. Apparently, 
appellants do not understand or are deliberately misstating the 
facts surrounding how the 9th South Property came to be an asset of 
the Estate. The 9th South Property was never owned by Morrison, 
Sr. or Morrison, Jr., either individually or in joint tenancy, at 
any time prior to Morrison Sr.'s death. Morrison, Jr. purchased 
the 9th South Property from the Estate. The 9th South Property 
became an asset of the Estate following Morrison, Sr.'s death, as 
the result of a trade for 4,000 shares of stock in the Morrison 
Investment Company that Morrison, Sr. owned at the time of his 
death. The 9th South Property was not one of the three parcels of 
real estate considered in the trial of the 1988 Action dealing with 
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the joint tenancy ownership issue• Appellant's argument in their 
brief on this point is ludicrous and merits no further discussion. 
Ill 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE 9TH SOUTH PROPERTY 
SALES PROCEEDS WAS AN IMPROPER DISTRIBUTION 
AND RECOVERY OP THE DISTRIBUTION IS NOT 
BARRED BY ADJUDICATION, ESTOPPEL OR LIMITATION. 
Appellants do not appeal the district court's decision that 
the attorney fees and costs owed to Campbell Maack & Sessions and 
the estate income taxes are valid obligations of the Estate or that 
the obligation for attorney fees and costs has priority in payment 
over the obligation for estate income taxes. Further, appellants 
do not raise in their brief the issue of whether the distribution 
of the 9th South Property sales proceeds was "improper" as found by 
the district court. The sole issue on appeal is whether West One 
is barred from recovery of the improper distribution under Utah 
law. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-909, the district court held 
in the 1995 Order that the distribution was "improper" and ordered 
that "sufficient funds should be repaid on a pro rata basis so that 
the claims against the estate may be satisfied." R. 1724-6. Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-3-909 provides: 
Unless the distribution or payment no longer can be 
questioned because of adjudication, estoppel, or 
limitation, a distributee of property improperly 
distributed or paid, or a claimant who was 
improperly paid, is liable to return the property 
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improperly received and its income since 
distribution if he has the property. If he does 
not have the property, then he is liable to return 
the value as of the date of disposition of the 
property improperly received and its income and 
gain received by him. 
The Editorial Board Comment to the section provides: 
The term "improperly" as used in this section must 
be read in light of § 75-3-703 and the manifest 
purpose of this and other sections of the Code to 
shift questions concerning the propriety of various 
distributions from the fiduciary to the 
distributees in order to prevent every 
administration from becoming an adjudicated matter. 
Thus, a distribution may be "authorized at the 
time" as contemplated by S 75-3-703, and still be 
"improper" under this section. Section 75-3-703 is 
designed to permit a personal representative to 
distribute without risk in some cases, even though 
there has been no adjudication. When an 
unadjudicated distribution has occurred, the rights 
of persons to show that the basis for the 
distribution (e.g., an informally probated will, or 
informally issued letters of administration) is 
incorrect, or that the basis was improperly applied 
(erroneous interpretation, for example) is 
preserved against distributees by this section. 
Id. cmt. (emphasis added). Thus, the sole issue to be decided in 
this appeal is whether recovery by West One of the improperly 
distributed sales proceeds is barred by "adjudication, estoppel or 
limitation." Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-909. 
Adjudication 
In their brief, appellants assert no claim of an adjudication, 
and West One knows of no adjudication made, which would bar the 
application of Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-909 in this case. The 
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distribution was made pursuant to court order due to the fact that 
West One had resisted the distribution. West One resisted the 
distribution due to the many contingencies that were still present 
in the administration of the Estate at that time. The 1992 Order 
does not explicitly, or even implicitly, bar the application of 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-909, which permits West One to recover the 
distribution, if funds are needed to pay valid costs of 
administration of the Estate. 
Estoppel 
In their brief, appellants argue that the "law of the case" 
doctrine bars application of Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-909 and estops 
West One from the recovery of the improper distribution. The "law 
of the case" doctrine has been applied "when addressing at least 
four distinct sets of problems." Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 
P.2d 1034, 1037 n.2 (Utah 1995). The branch of the doctrine which 
appellants attempt to apply in this case provides that "a court is 
justified in refusing to reconsider matters it resolved in a prior 
ruling in the same case for reasons of efficiency and consistency." 
Id. at 1038. 
The disputed matters resolved in the 1992 Order were that 
(i) the 9th South Property was to be sold to Morrison, Jr. and 
(ii) the net sales proceeds were to be distributed to the heirs. 
West One complied with both elements of the 1992 Order. In the 
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1992 Order, the district court did notf however, make any 
additional explicit ruling, or even intimate, that the distribution 
could not eventually be recovered if needed to pay the valid 
obligations of the Estate. 
Even if this Court were to consider that the ruling of the 
district court in the 1992 Order constituted the "law of the case" 
to the effect that the distribution could not be recovered by West 
One, the Utah Supreme Court stated in Thurston that "(1) when there 
has been an intervening change of controlling authority; (2) when 
new evidence has become available; or (3) when the court is 
convinced that its prior decision was clearly erroneous and would 
work a manifest injustice", a court may reopen issues previously 
decided. Id. at 1039. The district court must have considered the 
later two conditions as a basis for reopening the issue of whether 
the distribution could be recovered by West One. 
As to the second condition of "new evidence becoming 
available," numerous items of evidence and facts and the resolution 
of related issues were not before the district court as of December 
23, 1992. First, the outcome of the 1988 Action had not been 
determined. Had the jury in the 1988 Action concluded that 
Morrison, Sr. and Morrison, Jr. did not hold the three parcels of 
real property in joint tenancy at the time of Morrison, Sr.'s 
death, the Estate would have received property with a value in 
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excess of $500,000.00 and the present problem of insufficient 
assets in the Estate to pay its obligations would not be present. 
Second, the amount of the attorney fees and costs incurred by West 
One to prosecute the 1988 Action had not been determined as of 
December 23, 1992. Third, the fact that additional estate income 
taxes were due was not discovered until after December 23, 1992. 
Certainly, these subsequently discovered facts and subsequently 
decided issues would permit the district court to reconsider its 
ruling made in the 1992 Order. 
The district court may also have considered the third 
condition permitting reconsideration of a prior ruling and 
concluded in 1995 that its prior decision was clearly erroneous and 
would work a manifest injustice. A foundational tenant of Utah 
probate law is that "[t]he assets of an estate belong first to 
creditors with the remainder to heirs and legatees and devisees." 
Dennett v. First Security Bank, N.A. , 439 P.2d 459, 461 (Utah 
1968) . It would be clearly erroneous and constitute manifest 
injustice for valid claims of the Estate for estate income taxes 
and attorney fees and costs to remain unpaid, while the heirs 
receive distributions in excess of $326,000.00. 
In summary, West One has complied with the terms of the 1992 
Order in that the 9th South Property was sold to Morrison, Jr. and 
the net sales proceeds have been distributed to the heirs. The 
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"law of the case" doctrine does not estop application of Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-3-909 relative to the 1995 Order. 
Limitation 
Appellants next argue that Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1006 is a 
statute of limitation which bars application of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-3-909. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1006 provides 
(1) Unless previously adjudicated in a 
formal testacy proceeding or in a proceeding 
settling the accounts of a personal 
representative or otherwise barred, the claim 
of any claimant to recover from a distributee 
who is liable to pay the claim, and the right 
of any heir or devisee or of a successor 
personal representative acting in their 
behalf, to recover property improperly 
distributed or the value thereof from any 
distributee is barred at the later of: 
(a) as to a claim by a creditor of the 
decedent, one year after the decedent's death; 
and 
(b) as to any other claimant and any 
heir or devisee, at the later of: 
(i) three years after the decedent's 
death; or 
(ii) one year after the time of 
distribution thereof. 
(2) This section does not bar an action to 
recover property or value received as the 
result of fraud. 
This section does not limit the time in which a personal 
representative may recover an improper distribution but rather 
limits only the time in which creditors with claims, and heirs and 
devisees of a decedent, or a successor personal representative 
acting in their behalf, may bring an action against distributees. 
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The Editorial Board Comment provides "[t]his section describes an 
ultimate time limit for recovery by creditors, heirs and devisees 
of a decedent from distributees. . . . (3) The limitation of this 
section ends the possibility of appointment of a personal 
representative to correct an erroneous distribution. . . . " Id. 
West One is neither a creditor, heir, nor devisee of the Estate. 
See, Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201(4) , (8) , (17). Nor is West One a 
successor personal representative. West One is the personal 
representative that made the distribution and can, therefore, 
recover it. Accordingly, there is no statute of limitation which 
bars West One's recovery of the improper distribution of the sales 
proceeds from the heirs. 
In conclusion, the distribution of the proceeds from the sale 
of the 9th South Property by West One to the heirs constituted an 
improper distribution. West One may recover that improper 
distribution pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-909. The recovery 
is not barred by adjudication, estoppel, or limitation. 
IV 
RECOVERY OF THE SALES PROCEEDS FROM THE HEIRS DOES 
NOT VOID THE 9TH SOUTH PROPERTY SALES TRANSACTION NOR DOES 
IT PERMIT MORRISON, JR. TO VOID THE SALES TRANSACTION. 
Appellants argue that allowing West One to recover a portion 
of the sales proceeds from the heirs voids the sale of the 9th 
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South Property or should permit Morrison, Jr. to void the 
transaction. Both arguments are without merit and must fail. 
First, this issue was not argued in the district court and may 
not be raised for the first time on appeal. Kleinert v. Kimball 
Elevator Co.. 905 P.2d 301 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("We are governed 
by the general principle that matters not put in issue before the 
trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal.") 
Accordingly, this Court may not entertain or consider this argument 
of appellants. 
Second, the ruling of the district court in the 1992 Order, 
and the conditions and terms of the sale have been performed by 
West One. The property was sold by West One to Morrison, Jr. and 
the proceeds were distributed to the heirs. Appellants cannot 
argue to the contrary. As stated above, there is no condition in 
the offer to purchase the 9th South Property by Morrison, Jr. or in 
the 1992 Order that the sales proceeds could not ultimately be 
recovered by West One from the heirs to pay the costs of 
administration or other obligations of the Estate, which recovery 
is expressly provided for by statute. West One has fully performed 
any contractual or statutory duties it had and has fully complied 
with all orders of the district court. 
For the above-stated reasons, the 9th South Property sales 
transaction is neither void nor voidable by Morrison, Jr. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the above-stated reasons, this appeal should be dismissed 
or the 1995 Order of the district court should be affirmed. West 
One respectfully requests, in addition, that it be awarded its 
attorney fees and costs incurred herein. 
DATED this of June 1996. 
CAMPBELL MAACK &, SESSIQJ 
:LARK W. SESSIC 
DEAN C. ANDREASEN 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the P^ffi day of June 1996, true and 
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE was mailed, 
postage prepaid, first-class, to: 
Lowell V. Summerhays 
ADAMSON & SUMMERHAYS 
448 East 6400 South, Suite 135 
Murray, Utah 84107 
AjUAnn. I . Umh. 
'/UlMri 
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ADDENDUM 
A - Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-909 
B - Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1006 
C - Closing documents relative to sale of the 9th South 
Property by West One to Morrison, Jr. 
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Tab A 
75-3-909. Improper distribution — Liability of distributee. 
Unless the distribution or payment no longer can be questioned because of 
adjudication, estoppel, or limitation, a distributee of property improperly dis-
tributed or paid, or a claimant who was improperly paid, is liable to return the 
property improperly received and its income since distribution if he has the 
property. If he does not have the property, then he is liable to return the value 
as of the date of disposition of the property improperly received and its income 
and gain received by him. 
History: C. 1953, 75-3-909, enacted by L. 
1975, ch. 150, § 4. 
Editorial Board Comment. — The term 
"improperly" as used in this section must be 
read in light of § 75-3-703 and the manifest 
purpose of this and other sections of the Code 
to shift questions concerning the propriety of 
various distributions from the fiduciary to the 
distributees m order to prevent every adminis-
tration from becoming an adjudicated matter. 
administration) is incorrect, or that the basis 
was improperly applied (erroneous interpreta-
tion, for example) is preserved against distrib-
utees by this section 
The definition of "distributee" to include the 
trustee and beneficiary of a testamentary trust 
in 75-1-201(10) is important m allocating lia-
bilities that may arise under §§ 75-3-909 and 
Thus, a distribution may be "authorized at the 
time" as contemplated by § 75-3-703, and still 
be "improper" under this section Section 
75-3-703 is designed to permit a personal rep-
resentative to distribute without risk m some 
cases, even though there has been no adjudica-
tion When an unadjudicated distribution has 
occurred, the rights of persons to show that the 
basis for the distribution (e.g., an informally 
probated will, or informally issued letters of 
75-3-910 on improper distribution by the per-
sonal representative under an informally pro-
bated will. The provisions of §§ 75-3-909 and 
75-3-910 are based on the theory that liability 
follows the property and the fiduciary is ab-
solved from liability by reliance upon the infor-
mally probated will. 
PROBATE OF WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION 75-3-911 
TabB 
75-3-1006. Limitations on actions and proceedings against 
distributees. 
(1) Unless previously adjudicated in a formal testacy proceeding or in a 
proceeding settling the accounts of a personal representative or otherwise 
barred, the claim of any claimant to recover from a distributee who is liable to 
pay the claim, and the right of any heir or devisee or of a successor personal 
representative acting in their behalf, to recover property improperly distrib-
uted or the value thereof from any distributee is barred at the later of: 
(a) as to a claim by a creditor of the decedent, one year after the dece-
dent's death; and 
(b) as to any other claimant and any heir or devisee, at the later of: 
(i) three years after the decedent's death; or 
(ii) one year after the time of distribution thereof. 
(2) This section does not bar an action to recover property or value received 
as the result of fraud. 
History: C. 1953, 75-3-1006, enacted by L. 
1975, ch. 150, § 4; 1992, ch. 179, § 11. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1992, deleted "forever" 
before "barred" near the end of the introduc-
tory language of Subsection (1); added new 
Subsection (l)(a) and the introductory para-
graph in Subsection (1Kb); and redesignated 
former Subsections (l)(a) and (1Kb) as (l)(b)(i) 
and (lKbKii). 
Editorial Board Comment. — This section 
describes an ultimate time limit for recovery 
by creditors, heirs and devisees of a decedent 
from distributees. It is to be noted: (1) 
§ 75-3-107 imposes a general limit of three 
years from death on one who must set aside an 
informal probate in order to establish his 
rights, or who must secure probate of a late-
discovered will after an estate has been admin-
istered as intestate. Hence the time limit of 
§ 75-3-107 may bar one who would claim as an 
heir or devisee sooner than this section, al-
though it would never cause a bar prior to 
three years from the decedent's death. (2) This 
section would not bar recovery by a supposed 
decedent whose estate has been probated. See 
§ 75-3-412. (3) The limitation of this section 
ends the possibility of appointment of a per-
sonal representative to correct an erroneous 
distribution as mentioned in §§ 75-3-1005 and 
75-3-1008. If there have been no adjudications 
under § 75-3-409, or possibly §§ 75-3-1001 or 
75-3-1002, estate of the decedent which is dis-
covered after administration has been closed 
may be the subject of different distribution 
than that attending the estate originally ad-
ministered. 
The last sentence excepting actions or suits 
to recover property kept from one by the fraud 
of another may be unnecessary in view of the 
blanket provision concerning fraud in Chapter 
1. See § 75-1-106. 
Coordinating Clause. — Laws 1992, ch. 
179, § 18 provides: "The amendments to Sec-
tions 75-3-801, 75-3-803, 75-3-806, 75-3-807, 
75-3-1003, and 75-3-1006 shall apply only to 
the estates of decedents who die on or after the 
effective date of this act [July 1, 1992]. All 
other amendments shall be effective for all es-
tates upon the effective date of this act." 
TabC 
WHEN RECORDED RETURN TO: 
WEST ONE TRUST COMPANY 
107 SOUTH MAIN STREET #303 
P.O. BOX 3058 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84110-3058 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S DEED 
FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION OF Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other 
good and valuable consideration, WEST ONE TRUST COMPANY, acting in 
its capacity as the PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF MERLIN 
R. MORRISON, hereby CONVEYS AND SELLS, WITHOUT WARRANTY, unto EDNA 
MORRISON AND MERLIN R. MORRISON JR, HER SON, AS JOINT TENANTS, WITH 
FULL RIGHTS OF SURVIVORSHIP AND NOT AS TENANTS IN COMMON Grantee, 
the following described tract of real property situate in SALT LAKE 
County, State of UTAH: 
LOTS 1 TO 5 INCLUSIVE, BLOCK 1 LINDEN PARK, AMENDED PLAT AS 
RECORDED IN THE OFFICE OF THE RECORDER OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH. 
Witness the hand of said Grantor, this 
« = > ' " 
day of July 1, 1993 
West One Trust Company 
Personal Representative of 
the Estate Of MERLIN,R.^MORRISON 
By: kr^9z 
Title: 7^< 
State of Utah ) 
:ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
me, 
On this 1st day of July, 1993 
the undersigned notary, CEVAN J. 
, personally appeared before 
LESIEUR who said that he is 
the Property Officer of West One Trust Company and who proved to me 
his identity through documentary evidence in the form of a driver's 
license to be the signer of the foregoing instrument and who 
acknowledged to me that he execut/Bek it^f or its stated purpose. 
NOTARY PUBLIC / 
RESIDING AT: Salt'Lake City, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
01-Jul -93 03:38 PM 
S E L L E R ( S ) F I N A L C L O S I N G S T A T E M E N T 
Prepared by 
METRO NATIONAL TITLE 
111 EAST BROADWAY, SUITE 111 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
(801) 363-6633 
eller(s) WEST ONE TRUST COMPANY, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE 
ESTATE OF MERLIN R. MORRISON 
uyer(s) EDNA MORRISON, MERLIN R. MORRISON, JR. 
ender 
Lot 1-5 Block 1 LINDEN PARK AMENDED PLAT SALT LAKE C 
07/01/1993 
92006821 
roperty.... 
losing date 
lie Number, 
ALES PRICE 340,000.00 
LUS CREDITS: 
TOTAL CREDITS 
SALES PRICE PLUS TOTAL CREDITS 
0.00 
340,000.00 
ESS CHARGES: 
ELINOUENT 1990 TAXES 
OUNTY TAXES 01/01/1993 TO 07/01/1993 
ETTLEMENT OR CLOSING FEE 
PAYEE: METRO NATIONAL TITLE 
ITLE INSURANCE 
PAYEE: METRO NATIONAL TITLE 
TOTAL CHARGES 
GLANCE DUE TO SELLER 
8,209.99 
3,031.99 
600.00 
1,305.00 
13,146.98 
326,853.02 
My signature hereon acknowledges approval of tax prorations, and 
ignifies my understandmq that prorations were based on fiqures for 
receding year, or estimates for current year, and in event of any 
lanqe for current year, all necessary adiustments must be made between 
eller and Purchaser direct; likewise any DEFICIT in delinquent taxes 
ill be reimbursed to Title Company by the Seller. The undersiqned further 
^knowledges the above information was assembled from sources other than 
us company and therefore, this company cannot quarantee the accuracy 
nereof. Interest on existing liens is figured to the date indicated 
id additional interest may have to be collected, if necessary, to 
scure release from the lienholder. 
We approve the foreqomg settlement statement, in its entirety, 
jthorize payments inyaccordance therewith and acknowledge receipt of 
copy thereof. 
:LLER 
: L L E R ^ ^ V - ^ ^ ?"/" sfd'/^—772 & c// C~£ 
"TRO W A T O O N A ^ TITLE 
Escrow Ofzicer 
J2L 
0I-Jul-93 12:53 PM 
B U Y E R ( S > F I N A L C L O S I N G S T A T E M E N T 
Prepared by 
METRO NATIONAL TITLE 
111 EAST BROADWAY, -SUITE 111 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
(801) 363-6633 
ler(s) 
erls) 
ier...... 
-»ert y . . . . 
jinq date 
- Number. 
WEST ONE TRUST COMPANY, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE 
ESTATE OF MERLIN R. MORRISON 
fDNA MORRISON, MERLIN R. MORRISON, JR. 
Lot 1-5 Block 1 LINDEN PARK AMENDED PLAT SALT LAKE C 
07/01/1993 
92006821 
S PRICE 340,000.00 
CHARGES: 
LEMENT OR CLOSING FEE 
YEE: METRO NATIONAL TITLE 
RDING FEES DEED S 20.00 
TOTAL CHARGES 
SALES PRICE PLUS TOTAL CHARGES 
200.00 
20.00 
220.00 
340,220.00 
CREDITS: 
TY TAXES 01/01/1993 TO 07/01/1993 
TOTAL CREDITS 
3,031.99 
3CE DUE FROM BUYER 
3,0 31.99 
337,108.01 
My signature hereon acknowledges approval of tax prorations, and 
fies my understanding that prorations were based on figures for 
ding year, or estimates for current year, and in event of any 
e for current year, all necessary adjustments must foe made between 
r and Purchaser direct; likewise any DEFICIT in delinquent taxes 
be reimbursed to Title Company by the Seller. The undersigned further 
wledges the above information was assembled from sources other than 
company and therefore, this company cannot guarantee the accuracy 
of. Interest on existing liens is figured to the date indicated 
iditional interest may have to be collected, if necessary, to 
3 release from the lienholder. 
We approve the foregoing settlement statement, in its entirety, 
•size payments in accordance therewith and acknowledge receipt of 
vr thereof. 
>4rWv>g/ • -fuskr 
FIONAL T I T L E 
